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1. Introduction 
In recent years the European Union (EU) has suggested that electricity markets should 
be more interconnected in order to create regional markets, rather than ones limited by 
State borders. The main advantages of larger markets are the enhancement of security 
of supply and a reduction in reserves needed to maintain any given level of system 
performance. Security of supply improves since problems on one grid may be 
alleviated by importing energy. Reserves can be lower since the outage of one plant 
will have a relatively smaller impact on a larger system. 
 
In line with European Union recommendations the most recent White Paper on energy 
published by the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources 
(DCMNR) in Ireland has declared that an additional interconnector with Great Britain 
will be implemented.1 The new interconnector is planned to be in place around 2012, 
will connect Wales with the Republic of Ireland and is expected to provide about 500 
Megawatts (MW) of capacity. 
 
As with other forms of trade, trade in electricity across borders is driven by price 
differentials between countries. The difference in price may arise for a series of 
reasons, for example because of differences in the technology of electricity 
generation, in demand patterns, in factor costs, in levels of competition and in forms 
of regulation. 
 
The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of additional electricity interconnection 
both on Ireland and on Great Britain. Specifically, I am interested in 1. the welfare 
effects of interconnection, i.e. who will gain and who will lose from additional 
interconnection; 2. the size of the interconnector necessary to make Great Britain and 
Ireland a single market; 3. the impact of additional interconnection on the level of 
competition in the electricity generation sector in Ireland. The results of question 1 
will suggest who should fund the project.  
 
Most of the research on interconnection and welfare assumes that the driving force 
behind welfare changes is the change in the strategic incentives of electricity 
                                                     
1 DCMNR (2007). Note that the DCMNR has recently been renamed Department of Communications, 
Energy and Natural Resources (DCENR).  
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generators. Independent of this issue of market power, the effect of interconnection is 
also affected by how the flows along the interconnector are allocated. When 
transmission and energy markets are separated, physical transmission rights are 
auctioned and traded in advance of energy markets. In integrated (or coupled) markets 
a single system operator simultaneously determines generation amounts and 
transmission flows. 
 
Neuhoff and Newbery (2005) measure the welfare effects of going from separate to 
integrated markets. They find that normally integrated markets lead to the highest 
social welfare. However prices might increase in the short run if the number of 
competitors in generation is initially very small and rises slowly, or if regulators of 
separate jurisdictions do not coordinate and reduce their level of supervision post 
integration. Hobbs et al. (2005) measure the welfare effects of interconnection 
between two equally sized markets, Belgium and the Netherlands. Specifically they 
estimate the increase in social surplus if markets go from being separate to being 
integrated. The authors focus on improvements that arise because flows in opposite 
directions are allowed to net each other out and because an explicit spot market is set 
up in Belgium, initially the high-price jurisdiction. The former simply allows a more 
intensive use of the interconnector, since constraints are loosened. The latter reduces 
the cost of selling electricity into Belgium since it allows agents to cover imbalances 
at a (more) predictable cost and therefore encourages entry of foreign companies in 
the Belgian market. They find that allowing for an efficient use of interconnectors is 
welfare enhancing. The size and distribution of the gains depend crucially on 
companies’ pricing behavior. If the Belgian incumbent behaves consistently as a 
Cournot competitor, Dutch consumers end up facing higher electricity prices. On the 
other hand if the Belgian incumbent is consistently a price taker gains in social 
surplus are smaller, but more evenly distributed between the Netherlands and 
Belgium. 
 
Ehrenmann and Neuhoff (2008), summarising the literature, find that in a two-node 
scenario moving to integrated markets is always going to reduce market power and 
increase welfare. In a three node scenario the theoretical results are ambiguous, but 
when they apply their findings to the case of interconnection between Germany, 
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Belgium, France and the Netherlands, they conclude that wholesale prices are 
reduced. 
 
Borenstein et al. (2000) analyze both how large the interconnector needs to be in 
order to define a single market and what the impact of interconnection is on 
competition. The authors determine that in a two-country world, where each country 
is identical and endowed with a monopolistic generator, a very small amount of 
interconnection is needed in order for the two monopolists to engage in (Cournot) 
competition in the larger market. Additionally, they find that the competitive effect is 
larger the smaller the number of initial competitors (in the absence of collusive 
behavior). Finally, they observe that even if the interconnector size is small, in 
equilibrium it will not be congested, suggesting that merchant interconnectors might 
not be remunerated for their investment. They apply this model to the deregulated 
market in California for 1998, analyzing the peak demand for December. Under a few 
assumptions they find that the interconnector between the southern and northern areas 
of California would have to be 3,835MW for the market to be competitive. This 
amounts to about 20 percent of the installed capacity in the smaller area.2 
 
Finally Moselle et al. (2006) analyze the electricity market in the Netherlands and 
measure how large an interconnector with Belgium/Germany would have to be to 
induce a competitive electricity market. They conclude that interconnection between 
the Netherlands and Belgium/Germany would have to be at least 6,500MW, or 30 
percent of total Dutch installed capacity in 2005. They reach this conclusion by 
evaluating if profitable price increases could be sustained by a monopolist in the 
Netherlands. For interconnection with Belgium/Germany of 6,500 MW prices would 
have to be 45 percent larger in order to increase profits. This increase is deemed high 
enough that regulators would detect it and is therefore not sustainable. Smaller sizes 
of interconnection would allow a monopolist to profitably increase prices with a low 
probability of detection, indicating segmented markets. 
 
                                                     
2 Own calculation based on the fact that peak demand in the south was approximately twice the peak in 
the north and using information on California installed capacity from: California Energy Commission, 
Siting and Environmental Protection Division, Power Plant Database, available at 
www.energy.ca.gov/database/powerplants and  
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This paper differs from the previous research by concentrating on the case of perfect 
competition in generation and by measuring the benefits of interconnection due to 
differences in demand, factor costs and generation technology. The issue of market 
power and strategic behaviour is the addressed separately in Section 4. As expected, I 
find that Ireland enjoys larger net benefits than Great Britain. This is not surprising 
since it starts off with higher wholesale electricity prices.  The results indicate that the 
interconnector owner is unable to extract all the welfare gains accruing from the 
interconnector, assuming efficient allocation of interconnection volume. This is 
especially true for larger amounts of interconnection and suggests that pure merchant 
investments in interconnection are unlikely. Finally, as the price of carbon dioxide 
increases to the point where it penalizes coal generation, relatively more abundant in 
Great Britain, the two markets become more similar. This decreases the amount of 
interconnection needed to establish an integrated market. 
 
Section 2 introduces the electricity systems of Great Britain and Ireland. Section 3 
describes the simulation model used in this paper and its results for different levels of 
interconnection and different prices of CO2 emission permits. Section 4 focuses on the 
effects of interconnection on competition in the Irish wholesale market. Section 5 
provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. The case of interconnection between Ireland and Great Britain 
A new All-Island Market for wholesale electricity, including both the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland, started on 1 November 2007. Each generator submits its 
bid to a common pool where a single price is determined for every half-hour period. 
The bids are designed to account only for the short run marginal costs of generators. 
Long run capital costs are covered by capacity payments, which are assigned to 
generators depending on their availability and on the tightness of the system in each 
period. When the margin between generation and demand of electricity is narrow, 
generators will receive larger payments to make their plants available.  More detailed 
information on the new market is reported in the Appendix. All plants in Ireland and 
Great Britain, as in the rest of Europe, are subject to the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) whereby generators are responsible for the cost of carbon emissions 
released during electricity production. 
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 In Great Britain the wholesale electricity market is operated within BETTA, the 
British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements, which includes England, 
Wales and Scotland. It was created in 2005 when Scotland joined NETA (New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements). NETA in turn replaced the pool arrangement that 
existed prior to 2001. Both NETA and BETTA are based on voluntary bilateral 
arrangements between generators, suppliers, traders and customers. In practice 
BETTA does not set a unique price, since the actual price generators are paid or 
customers have to pay is different if there is underproduction (for generators) or 
overconsumption (for consumers).3 In this paper, however, I abstract from the 
specific arrangements of the British market and model it as being the same as Ireland, 
that is as a pool system where generators bid short run marginal costs. I also consider 
Great Britain to be only linked to Ireland. In reality, in addition to Ireland, it is also 
connected to France and a new interconnector with the Netherlands is under 
construction. 
Table 1 summarizes some of the characteristics of the two electricity systems in 2005. 
In 2005, the maximum demand on the Irish system of 6,432 MW was reached in mid 
December. In Great Britain, the maximum demand, equal to 58,285 MW, occurred at 
the end of January. These values are typical of Northern European countries, where 
demand tends to be highest in the winter, when days are short and there is high 
demand for heating. The fact that the peaks do not occur at the same time suggests 
that, all other things being equal, a single Great Britain-Ireland market might induce 
savings, since it would need a smaller amount of installed capacity than the sum of the 
two independent systems. However, since periods of high demand are highly 
correlated in the two systems, in practice the savings would be small.4 The demand 
comparison also highlights the fact that the electricity system in Great Britain is about 
ten times as large as in Ireland. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 Newbery (2006) gives a thorough account of NETA, BETTA and their performance. 
4 For 2005 the correlation coefficient between the electricity demand curves in Ireland and Great 
Britain equalled 0.89, which is quite high. 
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        Table 1. Electricity systems in Great Britain and Ireland, 2005 
 Great Britain Ireland 
Installed capacity (MW)5  72,588 8,453 
Coal-fired installed capacity (%) 40% 14% 
Gas-fired installed capacity (%) 35% 51% 
Wind generation, installed capacity (%) 2% 8% 
Maximum hourly demand (MW) 58,285 6,432 
Installed capacity share of 3 largest generators6  39% 93% 
Isolated market Time-Weighted Average Price7 €29 €50 
           
Coal-fired generation accounted for a significantly larger share of generation capacity 
in Great Britain than in Ireland. Ireland in addition had about 5 percent of peat 
generation, designed to run continuously at baseload.  Gas-fired generation was a 
relatively larger component of the Irish system, making it the fuel most likely to set 
the price. Great Britain also had about 20 percent of nuclear generation capacity, 
designed to run continuously. This suggests that coal plants are likely to define the 
price of electricity more often in Great Britain than in Ireland, and the opposite is true 
for gas-fired generation. In addition, Ireland has about four times as much wind 
generation relative to its size than Great Britain. This is important because wind in 
Ireland has priority dispatch, and therefore will be used by the system operator any 
time it is available, displacing generation based on natural gas.  
 
Irish generation is dominated by the Electricity Supply Board (ESB), the incumbent. 
Alone, it accounted for a share of about 80 percent of the market in 2004. The Irish 
State owns 95 percent of ESB, with the remaining 5 percent owned by employees of 
the company. 8 Electricity generation in Great Britain is much less concentrated, with 
the top three generators jointly serving about 40 percent of the market. 
                                                     
5 Excludes interconnectors. 
6 End of 2004 information, from EU (2005). In this case, the statistic for Great Britain applies to all of 
the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland, whereas the number for Ireland is exclusively for the 
Republic of Ireland.  
7 Estimated short run marginal price weighted by the share of demand in each period, given 2005 fuel 
prices and a zero cost of carbon. 
8 For more details on the Irish electricity market, see FitzGerald et al. (2005). 
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 3. Simulation model and results 
In what follows the level of competition and the form of regulation are taken as being 
the same across the two countries, whereas factor costs, demand patterns and 
generation technologies are allowed to differ. Within this framework I calculate 
welfare changes for different levels of interconnection. I also study how sensitive the 
results are to changes in generation induced by different prices of CO2 emission 
permits. 
 
The average yearly wholesale price of electricity on the two islands is determined by 
optimal dispatch models for 2005. An exogenous demand curve determines the 
amount of electricity that is needed in each half hour of the year, with Great Britain 
and Ireland following separate patterns based on their actual 2005 demand. On the 
supply side, the model assumes identical wholesale markets on either side of the Irish 
Sea. They are modeled as mandatory pool systems, with generators bidding the short 
run marginal cost of electricity production. Essentially, the short run marginal cost 
accounts for fuel costs and costs of carbon emissions if the price of CO2 permits is 
positive. Plants are stacked according to their bid, from the cheapest to the most 
expensive, and the cheapest plants that are needed to match demand in each half hour 
are dispatched. The bid price of the marginal dispatched plant determines the system 
marginal price, and all the plants that are dispatched are remunerated at this price. The 
model takes into account key features of the electricity systems in Ireland and Great 
Britain. For Ireland it details all the plants generating electricity in 2005, their size, 
the type of fuel they use, their yearly availability (accounting for typical maintenance 
schedules) and how efficient they are at converting fuel into electricity.9 The dispatch 
model for Great Britain is similar to the one for Ireland, albeit less detailed. 
Generating plants that use the same type of fuel (e.g. coal or natural gas) are 
aggregated into a few large plants. The model assumes that generators bid their 
marginal cost of fuel, without any attempt to game the system.  
 
                                                     
9 The model abstracts from some more detailed engineering constraints, such as the time needed (and 
the costs incurred) to turn a power plant on or off and to increase or decrease output. It also does not 
account specifically for the provision of ancillary services, such as reserves. For more details on the 
simulation model, see McCarthy (2005). 
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I assume that there are no transmission constraints within Ireland or Britain, which 
yields a single wholesale price of electricity within each jurisdiction. The price of 
electricity in Great Britain determines the price at the Great Britain node of the 
interconnector. The average yearly price is calculated as the time weighted average 
price. I assume integrated markets, where the transmission flow is determined 
simultaneously with electricity generation. In any period where the prices at the two 
nodes of the interconnector are different, demand will increase for the low-cost 
country and decrease for the high-cost country until one of the following conditions is 
met: the prices are the same at the two nodes; the interconnector is congested; the 
low-cost country has exhausted its excess capacity. This eliminates all issues related 
to transmission ownership and non-competitive behavior that can be associated with 
the ownership of a scarce resource. As Joskow and Tirole (2005) and Turvey (2006) 
argue, the incentives associated with ownership of scarce resources may lead to 
inefficient allocation of interconnection flows and substantially vary the use of the 
interconnector and its associated benefits. 
 
Currently Ireland and Great Britain are joined by a 500MW high voltage direct 
current (HVDC) interconnector between Scotland and Northern Ireland that operates 
at 400MW. The government’s White Paper (DCMNR, 2007) has pledged additional 
interconnection and suggested that a 500MW interconnector between Wales and the 
Republic of Ireland (a distance of approximately 135 kms) might be implemented by 
2011. In these simulations I therefore start by analyzing a 500MW additional 
interconnector and gradually increase its size. An interconnector can be thought of as 
a piece of transmission infrastructure, but it can also be a substitute for generation for 
a country that mostly imports electricity. On the other hand for an exporting country 
interconnector flows are additional demand that must be served by domestic 
generators. Therefore the interconnector flows affect the price in both countries by 
changing the amount of electricity that must be generated domestically. 
 
The results presented in Tables 2 to 5 are based on 2005 fuel prices. This year is 
selected in part because it was the year chosen for the snapshot of the generating plant 
portfolio. In addition a quick analysis of the prices shows that the ratio of the prices of 
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coal and natural gas in 2005 was close to its ten-year average.10 This ratio is 
important because it determines the relative cost of coal and gas fueled plants, which 
between them set the system marginal price for the majority of periods in both the 
Irish and the British systems.  
                                                     
 
In what follows I evaluate the welfare effects of interconnection. In order to determine 
changes in social (international) surplus I distinguish between the groups affected by 
interconnection and specifically British and Irish consumers, British and Irish 
generators and the interconnector owner.11 The welfare changes taken into account in 
this section include those driven by price changes, by changes in generation patterns 
and changes in interconnector use. For consumers, welfare changes are calculated as 
the price difference induced by added interconnection multiplied by the level of 
annual demand, under the assumption that electricity generation is inelastic to price 
(at least in the short run).12 For producers the change in surplus measures the change 
in total industry short run profits when added interconnection is introduced. Short run 
profit is calculated as total yearly revenue minus total yearly fuel (and carbon) cost. 
Welfare changes for interconnector owners are calculated as the changes in total 
yearly revenues with respect to the baseline scenario, where the interconnector is 
400MW. Yearly revenues are calculated as the sum of half-hourly revenues, which 
are in turn measured by the price difference at the two nodes times the actual flow for 
each half-hour period. It should be noted that the welfare measures adopted here do 
not include welfare increases due to the need for lower reserves in the system, or 
those due to increased security of supply. Finally, note that in this section I do not 
address changes in competition due to increased interconnection. 
 
Table 2 displays the changes in welfare due to added interconnection for likely 
amounts of additional interconnection, namely 500MW, 1000MW and 1500MW. It 
also shows the changes in welfare with an interconnector large enough for the two 
markets to be integrated. When the cost of carbon is zero, the additional 
10 The ratio of the price of coal and natural gas (per ton of oil equivalent) is basically identical to the 
1996 – 2006 average for Ireland, and is equal to the average minus 1.2 standard deviations for Great 
Britain. 
11 Changes in consumer surplus are calculated under the assumption that changes in wholesale price are 
passed on to final consumers. 
12 Total annual electricity demand on the island of Ireland for 2005 was about 36 TWh (Tera Watt 
hour), whereas in Britain it was about 320 TWh. 
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interconnection amount needs to be quite large, at more than 3000MW. I define the 
markets to be integrated if the average yearly price in the two markets is similar.13 
 
The need for a large interconnector is driven by several factors. First of all the initial 
price difference is fairly large. Electricity prices are estimated to be about 40 percent 
lower in Great Britain than in Ireland. This is due both to the fuel price differences 
between the countries, and to technological differences. In 2005, the price of gas in 
Great Britain was about 20 percent lower than in Ireland (IEA 2006). As shown in 
Table 1, Great Britain also has a higher share of coal plants than Ireland and has a few 
nuclear plants, which are absent in the Irish system. Moreover in 2005 the capacity to 
demand ratio was quite low in Ireland, contributing to high prices. Additionally, in 
this model I assume that there are no transmission losses. Explicitly modeling 
transmission losses would somewhat decrease the amount of interconnection needed 
to achieve the same price of electricity at the two interconnector nodes, since the 
markets would be integrated when the price differential at the two nodes equalled the 
amount of transmission losses per MW. Finally, in Table 2 the assumption is that 
there is no cost for carbon emissions. This tends to favor coal plants, perhaps 
unrealistically keeping their cost of production low. 
 
 
Table 2. Annual welfare changes in million euro, 2005 prices 
 
Welfare effects of additional interconnection 
0 carbon costs 
 500MW 1000MW 1500MW  3400MW 
Irish Consumers 277 387 680 
Irish Producers 
166 
-143 -222 -281 -390 
GB Consumers 
GB Producers 
-55 
59 
-115 
124 
-182 
195 
-348 
367 
Interconnector 54 82 73 -62 
Net Benefit 81 145 193 246 
Net Benefit/MW 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.07 
Net Benefit/MW, last 500MW 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.04 
Capital cost/MW± 0.06-0.07    
     ± yearly capital cost, including fixed O&M 
 
Consumers in Ireland gain with more interconnection since they face lower wholesale 
prices. When the cost of carbon is zero, an additional interconnector of 500MW 
                                                     
13 To be more precise, I define the two prices to be similar when their difference is less than 1.5% of 
the Irish price. 
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causes prices in Ireland to decrease by about 9 percent. When interconnection is 
increased by 3400MW, the decrease in price is about 38 percent. 
 
The largest effects are on the Irish market, as expected. In all cases Irish consumers 
are the category that gains the most in absolute terms. The net effect for Great Britain 
is smaller than for Ireland, but of the same order of magnitude. Consumers in Great 
Britain end up with substantially lower welfare at high interconnection sizes, whereas 
producers gain somewhat. It should be noted that per capita changes in Great Britain 
are much smaller than in Ireland given that its population is about ten times larger. 
The net welfare effects for Ireland are generally larger than for Great Britain. 
Interconnector owners’ revenue depends on the flow and the price difference at the 
two nodes. Once the two systems are part of the same market interconnector owners 
obtain almost no revenue since the price at the two nodes is virtually the same. The 
negative welfare for interconnector owners at 3400MW of added interconnection 
reflects the fact that at that point they receive less revenue than in the baseline case, 
with 400MW, since the price difference between the two nodes decreases. As 
expected, the marginal benefit of additional interconnection decreases as the amount 
of interconnection increases. The decrease is even larger when focusing on the last 
500MW addition, as shown in the one to last row of Table 2. This is of interest if we 
assume that interconnectors are built in 500MW blocks, as is likely in an electricity 
system as small as Ireland. 
 
These welfare calculations are useful to compare different scenarios and they can be 
used to compare the welfare effects of interconnection to the capital costs of building 
it. The yearly estimated capital cost of an interconnector (per MW) is reported in the 
last row of Table 2. DKM (2003) estimated that a 500MW interconnector would cost 
about €185 million, although this amount is probably a lower bound. In 2007 Imera 
Power, a private company that is preparing a bid to build the East-West 
interconnector, suggested costs of about €150 million for a 350 MW interconnector 
(which would correspond to about €215 million for 500 MW), although these costs 
are not audited and could therefore rise (Construction Engineer, 2007). Taking the 
Imera estimate and adding the estimate for yearly fixed operations and maintenance 
costs listed in the DKM study (about €33 thousand per MW at 2005 prices), I can 
calculate a yearly capital cost for the interconnector. I use two alternative interest 
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rates, both coming from the Commission for Energy Regulation (2005). The first 
assumes that the interconnector will be state owned and equals to 3.73 percent. The 
second assumes that the interconnector will be a private investment. In this case the 
appropriate cost of capital is 6.58 percent. All this would suggest that the yearly 
capital cost for an interconnector is between €0.06 million €0.07 million per MW.14 
On this basis an interconnector up to 3400MW would have benefits larger than (or 
equal to) costs. If we consider that interconnectors are likely to come in 500MW 
instalments the move to 3400MW would decrease total welfare. In fact only about 
2000MW of additional interconnection would be built in this case. This calculation is 
based on the assumption that economies of scale in interconnection construction are 
negligible. 
 
Table 3. Revenue changes for interconnector owner in million euro, 2005 prices 
 
Welfare effects of additional interconnection 
0 carbon costs 
 500MW 1000MW 1500MW  3400MW 
Interconnector 54 82 73 -62 
Revenue/MW 0.11 0.08 0.05 -0.02 
Revenue/MW, last 500MW 0.11 0.06 -0.02 -0.22 
Capital cost/MW± 0.06-0.07    
± yearly capital cost, including fixed O&M 
 
Table 3 shows what happens to interconnector revenue as size increases. The results 
allow us to explore who would be likely to invest in additional interconnection. The 
comparison between the second row of Table 3 and the capital costs reported in the 
last row shows that a private interconnector owner might build up to 1000MW of 
interconnection, but would not provide any further investment. In fact, if 
interconnectors were to be built in blocks of 500MW, only 500MW of additional 
interconnection would be backed by private investment. This is much lower than what 
would be socially optimal.  
 
At this point I analyze what happens if the cost of carbon emissions is accounted for. 
The price of carbon allowances in the European Trading Scheme has varied between 
about €20/ton of CO2 in 2005 to €30/ton in April 2006 before falling sharply to much 
lower levels.15 As stronger policies to fight global warming are put in place, the cost 
                                                     
14 As mentioned, this includes yearly fixed operations and management costs, but not variable ones. 
15 Carbon prices come from www.eex.de 
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of carbon is expected to increase. Analyzing how sensitive the results are to different 
levels of the cost of carbon is also similar to studying their sensitivity to changes in 
relative fuel prices. The need to pay for carbon emissions makes coal plants less 
profitable relative to plants fuelled by natural gas. The following simulations consider 
three different levels of the cost of carbon dioxide: €20/ton, €30/ton and €50/ton. 
Once the cost of CO2 reaches €50/ton, coal plants become much less profitable.  
 
Figure 1. Irish price premium at different costs of carbon permits and interconnector size 
 
 
Figure 1 shows how the price difference between the two countries varies with 
interconnection size at different prices of CO2 emission permits. As the level of 
interconnection increases, the price difference between the two systems decreases, as 
expected. The biggest effect on prices, i.e. the area where the slope of the curves is 
steepest, occurs up to 1400MW of interconnection.16 While the decrease is almost 
linear when there is no carbon cost, the curves level off when the cost of carbon is 
included. For the two markets to become integrated (as defined in footnote 13), total 
interconnector size must be between 2400MW, when carbon costs are equal to 
€50/ton, to 4400MW at €20-€30/ton of carbon. Once the cost of carbon reaches 
€50/ton coal plants in Britain set the system price less often, substituted by gas plants. 
This makes the British system more similar to the Irish one and the price difference 
                                                     
16 This includes the current 400MW of the Moyle interconnector. 
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between the two narrows quickly as the interconnector size increases, which causes 
the minimum level of total interconnection needed for a single market to fall sharply 
to 2400MW.17 
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the welfare effects of added interconnection in the presence 
of carbon costs. As in Table 2, the amount of added interconnection considered is 
500MW, 1000MW, 1500MW and the minimum interconnection needed to make 
Ireland and Great Britain a single wholesale electricity market at each level of CO2 
price. The bottom rows report the net revenue per MW for an interconnector owner. 
 
Table 4. Annual welfare changes in million euro, 2005 prices; €20/ton carbon 
 
Welfare effects of additional interconnection 
€ 20/ton carbon 
 500MW    1000MW 1500MW  4000MW 
Irish Consumers 210 353 437 698 
Irish Producers -181 -288 -338 -415 
GB Consumers 
GB Producers 
-19 
20 
-39 
41 
-59 
61 
-174 
181 
Interconnector (IC) 42 58 62 -52 
Net Benefit 72 124 164 238 
Net Benefit/MW 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.06 
Net Benefit/MW last 500MW 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.001 
ICRevenue/MW 0.08 0.06 0.04 -0.01 
ICRevenue/MW last 500MW 0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.04 
    
 
   Table 5. Annual welfare changes in million euro, 2005 prices; €30/ton carbon 
 
Welfare effects of additional interconnection 
€ 30/ton carbon 
 500MW    1000MW 1500MW  4000MW 
Irish Consumers 232 398 470 656 
Irish Producers -199 -326 -372 -409 
GB Consumers 
GB Producers 
-37 
39 
-73 
76 
-107 
112 
-273 
285 
Interconnector (IC) 34 37 42 -44 
Net Benefit 68 113 145 214 
Net Benefit/MW 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.05 
Net Benefit/MW last 500MW 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.01 
ICRevenue/MW 0.07 0.04 0.03 -0.01 
ICRevenue/MW last 500MW 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.07 
   
                                                     
17 Since the curves flatten as the prices in the two jurisdictions converge, the amount of interconnection 
needed to create a single market is somewhat sensitive to the exact definition of integrated markets. If 
the markets were defined as integrated for a 5% price difference (as opposed to 1.5%), the amount of 
interconnection needed to achieve integration would be 400MW to 500MW lower.  
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 As the cost of carbon increases, the two systems become more ‘similar’ since coal 
generation is disincentivized. The effect can be seen comparing Table 4 and 5 to 
Table 2: any given level of interconnection becomes less useful. In fact total yearly 
welfare changes of an additional 500MW interconnector go from €81 million in the 
absence of carbon costs, to €72 million when the carbon cost is €20/ton, €68 million 
when it is €30/ton and finally €63 million in Table 6, where the carbon cost is 
€50/ton. 
 
Table 6 Annual welfare changes in million euro, 2005 prices; €50/ton carbon 
 
Welfare effects of additional interconnection 
€ 50/ton carbon 
 500MW    1000MW 1500MW  2000MW 
Irish Consumers 236 422 527 587 
Irish Producers -200 -339 -406 -438 
GB Consumers 
GB Producers 
-90 
94 
-173 
181 
-253 
267 
-328 
348 
Interconnector (IC) 23 9 -15 -40 
Net Benefit 63 99 119 128 
Net Benefit/MW 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.06 
Net Benefit/MW last 500MW 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.02 
ICRevenue/MW 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
ICRevenue/MW last 500MW 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 
 
 
As before, there are decreasing returns to interconnection. The addition of the first 
500MW has the largest effect on social surplus. It decreases costs for Irish consumers 
by about 8 percent. Once the interconnector size reaches 2000MW Irish consumers 
spend 20 percent less per MWh of electricity. Revenues for the interconnector owner 
decrease when the two systems become more similar. In fact, for an added 500MW of 
interconnection, interconnector revenue increases by €54 million with no cost of 
carbon, €34 million when carbon prices are €20/ton, down to €23 million at €50/ton. 
This is mostly due to the prices in the two jurisdictions being closer prior to 
interconnection. 
 
When the cost of carbon is €20-€30/ton, social welfare would be improved with 
interconnection up to (at least) 1500MW.  This conclusion is reached by comparing 
the net benefit per MW of interconnection in Tables 4 and 5 with the capital cost of 
interconnection presented in Table 2. Increasing interconnection by 4000MW, the 
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amount needed to create a single Ireland-Great Britain market, is unlikely to be 
welfare maximizing. A private interconnector owner would have the incentive to 
build only 500MW of additional interconnection, due to the rapid decrease in 
interconnector revenue per MW as interconnection size increases. When the price of 
carbon is €50/ton it is likely that a merchant investor would not build any additional 
interconnection at all. The socially optimal amount on the other hand is between 
1000MW and 1500MW, not quite reaching the level that would allow for a single 
market. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the measure of social welfare is not comprehensive. First of all 
issue of security of supply is excluded from the analysis. Furthermore a larger system 
will need a smaller percentage of reserves (amount of electricity generation above the 
maximum expected level of electricity consumption) than two small systems to 
maintain the same standard of service. This implies a reduced need for new 
investment in generation infrastructure and therefore allows the system to operate at 
lower cost. Both of these points would suggest that the amounts reported above 
underestimate the true welfare effects of interconnection. On the other hand, this 
model is static and does not account for possible changes in the generation structure in 
the two countries. If new generation makes the countries more similar over time, 
welfare effects of interconnection will decrease, with the opposite being true if the 
differences increase. In addition, since interconnection between Great Britain and 
Ireland is expected to increase over time, revenues for existing interconnectors will 
decrease. This paper has also assumed efficient use of interconnectors. If 
interconnectors were used inefficiently, their size would have to be larger to achieve 
the same results. Finally, the model does not consider competition issues. In as much 
as interconnection increases competition in the more concentrated market (in this case 
Ireland) the model is underestimating both welfare gains for Irish consumer and 
welfare losses for Irish generators and is potentially underestimating the losses to 
British consumers.18 I analyze the issue of competition in more detail in the following 
section. 
                                                     
18Higher levels of interconnection will reduce generators’ revenues also by increasing the margin 
between available generation and consumption of electricity, thereby diminishing generators’ capacity 
payments. 
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4. Competition effects 
The All-Island Market in principle does not admit anti-competitive behavior. All 
generators are expected to follow the bidding principles and bid their short-run 
marginal cost. There are concerns that market power might emerge anyway. 
Companies could increase their profits by limiting availability of plants, a behavior 
that emerged in the PJM market on the East Coast of the United States, for example 
(see Creti and Fabra, 2007). Plant availability in the Republic of Ireland has been 
below 80 percent for the past few years, compared to best practice availability rates of 
about 90 percent. The simulation model presented in this paper assumes that 
companies do not game the system, so it cannot be used to study changes in market 
power. I therefore analyze the issue indirectly. 
 
Since Ireland is the less competitive of the two systems, added interconnection will 
cause its level of competition to change the most. Figure 2 shows the level of 
competition in Ireland, measured by the Residual Supply Index (RSI) introduced by 
Sheffrin (2002). It also depicts how competition varies with different amounts of 
interconnection. The RSI is defined as: 
 
t
tt
t Demand
acityLargestCapcitySystemCapaRSI −=  
 
where LargestCapacity measures the installed capacity of the largest player in the 
market and t indexes the period. Essentially the RSI measures the importance of the 
largest player in the market. When the RSI is large it means that the largest player is 
not very influential, and the opposite is true if the RSI is small. Sheffrin (2002) 
suggested that for an electricity system to be considered competitive the RSI index 
should be above 1.1 at least 95 percent of the time. This corresponds to about 16,600 
half-hourly periods.  
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Figure 2. Irish RSI index with different amounts of interconnection (2005 data) 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the Irish market is far from this level in 2005, with the RSI 
above 1.1 for only about 50 percent of the time. An additional 500MW of 
interconnector does not improve the situation significantly, whereas once 3000MW is 
added the market is definitely classified as competitive. In fact the minimum level of 
additional interconnection needed to establish a competitive market according to this 
measure is around 1300MW. Including the existing 400MW of interconnection this 
corresponds to 1700MW, or about 18 percent of total Irish installed capacity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has studied the effects of additional interconnection between Ireland and 
Great Britain using a static optimal dispatch model. It is based on historic 2005 fuel 
prices and generation plant mix and assumes perfect competition in wholesale 
generation markets. The analysis also determines how sensitive the results are to 
changes in the cost of carbon. The main goals of the paper are to define: 1. the welfare 
effects of interconnection, i.e. who will gain and who will lose from additional 
interconnection; 2. the size of the interconnector necessary to make Great Britain and 
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Ireland a single market; 3. the impact of additional interconnection on the level of 
competition in the electricity generation sector in Ireland. 
 
In general Ireland gains and Great Britain loses with interconnection. In particular, 
Irish consumers are always the group that gains the most (and even more so in per 
capita terms). Irish producers are the group that loses the most. The sum of Irish and 
British social welfare increases with interconnection, although at a decreasing rate. 
 
In addition to measuring welfare changes for the whole economy, I have analyzed 
changes in returns to interconnector owners. The static model suggests that for small 
amounts of interconnection interconnector owners profit from the project, except 
when the cost of carbon reaches €50/ton. Under this scenario merchant 
interconnectors would not invest in any amount of additional interconnection. Taking 
into account dynamic effects the picture is likely to change. In particular the 
interconnector receives less revenue per MW as the size of interconnection increases. 
It also receives less as the linked systems become more similar since this causes the 
flows along the interconnector to decrease. This suggests that pure merchant 
investments are unlikely to take place in this area. If merchant investment is put in 
place it will be limited to an amount that falls short of the socially optimal one. Since 
most of the welfare benefits would accrue to Ireland, the entity most likely to finance 
additional interconnection is the Irish government. 
 
Results show that in order to create a single market between Ireland and Great Britain, 
there would have to be between 2000MW and 4000MW of additional interconnection. 
This represents between 24 and 47 percent of total Irish installed capacity and about 3 
to 6 percent of British installed capacity. As the cost of carbon rises, making coal 
plants less profitable, the difference between average electricity prices in the two 
systems diminishes and so does the minimum interconnection size necessary to 
achieve integrated markets. This suggests that technological differences are the main 
drivers of gains from trade and are definitely more important than differences in 
market size. 
 
The results show that it is unlikely that the level of interconnection needed to create a 
single market will be welfare enhancing. One should note however that there are a 
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few aspects likely to affect social surplus that are not taken into account in this paper. 
In particular, consumers might also benefit because the Irish electricity market would 
become more competitive, because of enhanced security of supply, and because the 
amount of reserves needed to maintain a secure system would be lower. On the other 
hand I have assumed throughout that interconnection will be allocated efficiently. If 
this were not the case, interconnection would have to be larger (and therefore costlier) 
in order to obtain the same benefits. 
 
Finally, I analyzed the size of interconnection that would lead to a competitive Irish 
generation market. Using the Residual Supply Index introduced by Sheffrin (2002) I 
find that interconnection would have to be at least 1700MW, or about 18 percent of 
existing Irish generation. Moselle et al. (2005) find that interconnection should be 
about 30 percent of existing installed capacity in order for the Dutch generation 
market to be competitive. The analysis in Borenstein et al. (2000) suggests that 
interconnection needs to amount to about 20 percent of installed capacity in northern 
California for that region to be competitive. 
 
The current analysis is based on a static model. However changes in the amount and 
type of installed generation will also affect the results. In particular, the large increase 
in wind installations currently taking place in Ireland might allow coal plants to set 
the price more often, given that wind is likely to substitute for baseload gas generation 
since it has priority dispatch. This would make the fuel of the system-price-setting 
plant more similar to the one in the British system and possibly reduce the amount of 
generation needed for integration of the markets. The same would be true if there 
were a greater investment in coal plants in Ireland. It is also possible that large wind 
investments in Ireland would take advantage of the interconnector to export more 
electricity from Ireland at times of high wind. These issues warrant further study. 
21 
References 
Borenstein, S., J. Bushnell and S. Stoft 2000. The competitive effects of transmission 
capacity in a deregulated electricity industry, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 21 
(2), 294-325 
Commission for Energy Regulation 2005. 2006-2010 Transmission Price Control 
Review: Transmission Asset Owner (TAO) and Transmission System Operator 
(TSO). A Decision Paper, CER/05/143 
Commission for Energy Regulation 2008. Trading and settlement code v. 4.2, 
available at: www.allislandmarket.com/MarketRules/ 
Construction Engineer 2007. The wild (East) West, November/December issue, 38-41 
Creti, A. and N. Fabra 2007. Supply Security and Short-Run Capacity Markets for 
Electricity, Energy Economics, vol. 29 (2), 259-276 
DCMNR 2007. Energy White Paper. Delivering a sustainable energy future for 
Ireland: the energy policy framework 2007-2020, available at: 
www.dcmnr.gov.ie/energy 
Denny, E. and M. O’Malley 2007. Carbon Prices and Asset Degradation – a Costly 
Combination for Electric Power Systems, Working Paper University College 
Dublin 
DKM 2003. Costs and benefits of East-West interconnection between the Republic of 
Ireland and UK electricity systems, report to the Commission for Energy 
Regulation 
Ehrenmann, A. and K. Neuhoff 2008. A comparison of electricity market designs in 
networks, Operations Research forthcoming 
EU 2005. Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market: 
technical annex to the report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, Commission staff working paper 
FitzGerald, J., M. Keeney, N. McCarthy, E. O’Malley and S. Scott 2005. Aspects of 
Irish Energy Policy, ESRI Policy Research Series, 57 
Hobbs, B., Rijkers, F. and M. Boots 2005. The more cooperation, the more 
competition? A Cournot analysis of the benefits of electric market coupling, The 
Energy Journal, vol. 26 (4) 69-97 
IEA 2006. Energy prices and taxes, 4th quarter 2006 
Joskow, P. and J. Tirole 2005. Merchant transmission investment, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, vol. 53 (2), 233-264 
McCarthy, N. 2005. Market size, market structure and market power in the Irish 
electricity industry, ESRI Working Paper 168 
Moselle, B., Newbery, D. and D. Harris 2006. Factors affecting geographic market 
definition and merger control for the Dutch electricity sector, Brattle Group final 
report, June 
22 
Neuhoff, K. and D. Newbery 2005. Evolution of electricity markets: does sequencing 
matter? Utilities policy, vol. 13, 163-173 
Newbery, D. 2006. Electricity liberalization in Britain and the evolution of market 
design, in Electricity market reform: an international perspective, F. Sionshasi 
and W. Pfaffenberger (Eds), Elsevier 
Sheffrin, A. 2002. Predicting Market Power Using the Residual Supply Index, mimeo, 
Department of Market Analysis, California ISO 
Single Electricity Market Committee 2008. A review of the effectiveness of PCAP 
and PFLOOR, Consultation Paper SEM-08-071, available at: 
www.allislandproject.org/en/trading-settlement-code-consultation.aspx 
Turvey, R. 2006. The economics of interconnectors, Energy Policy, vol. 34 (13) 1457-
1472 
 
23 
24 
                                                     
Appendix 
The All-Island wholesale market: rules of the game19 
The Irish All-Island Market (AIM) started in November 2007. It includes both the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland and was designed with the goal of 
increasing investment in new generating plants and availability of existing generators. 
The AIM is characterized by a single pool market for wholesale electricity, where all 
generators submit their bids, and a system of capacity payments. Participation in the 
pool is mandatory for any generator with an export capacity larger than 10 MW. Each 
plant that generates electricity during a given period is paid the same price, which is 
determined by the bid of the most expensive plant necessary to meet electricity 
consumption in that period. 
Bids 
For each trading day generators offer their bids up to a day ahead of trade. Each bid 
consists of a maximum of 10 price-quantity pairs that are subject to price floors and 
caps set by the regulator.20 In addition generators submit the cost of no load 
(representing operation costs invariant to actual generation) and ramp up costs (the 
cost of increasing generation volumes). The bid pairs, no load and ramp up costs are 
the same for all periods of the relevant day. Generators can also attach technical 
conditions to their bid, including a minimum level of generation and a minimum 
number of periods of generation or downtime. Bidding principles require that 
generators bid their short run marginal cost. 
Capacity payments 
Every year the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) determines the size of the 
pot for capacity payments. It is calculated as the price needed to cover fixed costs of a 
‘best new entrant’ peaking plant multiplied by the volume needed to maintain a 
predetermined reliability standard (defined as a maximum amount of hours of lost 
load during the year). The pot is then distributed among generators depending on their 
availability. Plants that are available at times when the margin between electricity 
demanded and electricity supplied is tight will be allocated a relatively larger share of 
the pot. 
Interconnector 
Registered users can bid up to 10 price-quantity pairs for the interconnector for every 
time period during the day, up to a day ahead of trade. The sum of all these bids (up to 
the capacity of the interconnector) is bid by the interconnector owner in the pool. The 
interconnector is paid capacity payments based on the actual flow along the 
interconnector at every period. 
19 For further details, see Commission for Energy Regulation (2008) and documents cited therein. 
20 These limits are currently quite loose. The price floor is set at € -100/MWh, whereas the price cap is 
set at €1,000/MWh. Neither of these limits has been reached up to April 2008 (Single Electricity 
Market Committee, 2008). 
